At the interface of security and development – Addressing fragility through good governance of the security sector

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The future of multilateralism and global governance rest on the realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the twin Sustaining Peace resolutions. However, there are great challenges to their implementation and progress is slow. Hard-earned development gains are lost in contexts increasingly characterized by fragility, conflict, and violence. This policy brief calls for the Group of Twenty to curb the ensuing stalled development opportunities through governance-driven security sector engagement, in turn, strengthening coping capacities and reducing risk factors.

Challenge

The future of multilateralism and global governance rests on the realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the twin Sustaining Peace resolutions endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council (United Nations 2015, 2016). The 2030 Agenda is characterized by its universality, the indivisible nature of its constituent Sustainability Development Goals (SDGs), emphasis on integrated solutions across realms and sectors, and pledges to leave no one behind, as well as to reach the furthest behind first. It paves the way for a new type of multilateralism: one that requires greater coordination, collaboration, and commitment among and between states and organizations, including the Group of Twenty (G20) and non-member countries, multilateral organizations, and civil society organizations. Similarly, the twin Sustaining Peace resolutions break conceptual new ground by focusing on sustaining peace “at all stages of conflict and in all its dimensions” and on the imperative to “prevent the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict” (United Nations 2016). This imperative has grown in light of the recorded deterioration of global peacefulness since 2008 (Institute for Economics & Peace 2019).

However, there are significant challenges in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and progress is slow. Conflict, violence and fragility are considered the major obstacles in reaching the SDGs by 2030 (United Nations and World Bank 2018). According to the World Bank Group (2018), around half of the world’s extreme poor will live in countries characterized by fragility, conflict, and violence. Growing inequalities and grievances, fueled by perceptions of injustice and the lack of opportunity, further exacerbate the spectrum of risk factors that lead to fragile states. The economic cost of stalled development opportunities is significant, and the spillover effects, such as organized crime, irregular migration, populism, and violent extremism have a global impact. Defined by the OECD as “the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state to address risks” (OECD 2018, 82), fragility manifests in governments that provide extreme privilege and impunity to the few at the expense of the many. State institutions are subsequently unable to address economic, environmental, political, societal, and security risks due to chronically poor governance that is characterized by the lack of oversight, accountability, and trust. A pertinent manifestation of fragile institutions is currently unfolding amid the COVID-19 pandemic, indiscriminately exposing the
unpreparedness of governments across the globe. In many cases, this governance style requires the politicization of the security sector. This occurs as political authorities instrumentalize the security sector for political ends or as security actors themselves demonstrate political bias in their service provision. Security services may therefore be filled with unqualified staff due to patronage, and be partisan, non-inclusive, and committed to securing the regime rather than the citizenry. This can force the population to turn towards alternative security providers, such as private or informal security actors, potentially augmenting the violence security services are mandated to address. Furthermore, approaches to security sector and justice reform often fail to recognize the implications of reform for the political economy, as well as the implications of lost economic opportunities for those who would benefit from reform. As such, state fragility primarily relates to a lack of political legitimacy. Countries with exclusionary politics, weak governance, poor rule of law, and high rates of corruption have a significantly higher risk of fragility and generalized violence (Grimm, Lemay-Hébert, and Nay 2014). Notably, fragility applies to all countries, albeit to different degrees.

Proposal

The Potential of Security Sector Governance and Reform

Addressing fragility through security sector reform

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the twin Sustaining Peace resolutions endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council have placed a renewed focus on the role of well-governed institutions for sustainable development and peacebuilding. The 2030 agenda broadened the scope of development and validated the security and development nexus through Sustainable Development Goal 16 which calls for peaceful, just, and inclusive societies. In turn, the Sustaining Peace agenda sets prevention of violent conflict as a policy priority and underlines the importance of good security sector governance (SSG) and reform. Security sector reform (SSR) is “a process [...] led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and will full respect for human rights and the rule of law” (United Nations 2008). In essence, good security sector governance entails the delivery of effective public safety measures in the context of broader democratic norms.

Recognizing the catalytic role of a security sector aligned with principles of good governance is a crucial step in addressing fragility and accelerating sustainable development. Thereby, SSR acts as a potent policy tool to establish or to strengthen justice and security institutions that are accessible and responsive to the needs and rights of all individuals, managed through civilian oversight and placed within a framework of the rule of law. However, security sector interventions require not only intensive and innovative cooperation among states and non-state actors, but also the development of governance-driven instead of hard security-driven responses. Focusing on the provision of inclusive security in an accountable and effective way actively increases the resilience of states and societies by reducing the exposure to risks and strengthening coping capacities to address said risks. It further reconstructs the social contract between the state and its people, increasing trust and legitimacy of state institutions.

Different factors shape a country’s pathway into and out of fragility, but the term fragile states relates to service delivery (Woolcock 2014). The 2015 States of Fragility Framework by the OECD explains fragility as exposure to risk and coping capacity that addresses risk across five dimensions: economic, environmental, political, security, and societal fragility. SSG/R contributes to reducing risk and strengthening coping capacity in multiple different ways; in many ways, both are done in parallel. The Institute for Economics & Peace defined exposure to risk as the “combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences” and coping capacity as the “combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available within a community, society or organization that can be used to achieve agreed goals” (2017).

Exposure to risk and SSR’s response

Risk factors most relevant to SSR processes primarily manifest in expressions of violence (e.g., homicide rate and violent crime), perceptions of state bodies (e.g., perceptions of corruption) and unaddressed grievances (e.g., unrepresentative, clientelist regimes). While there is limited empirical basis for SSR interventions creating lowered exposure to risk factors, successful approaches to SSR are strongly associated with positive outcomes. For example, in Colombia, a national plan that focused on community and problem-oriented policing strategies in cities registered a 22% reduction in homicide over two years (Muggah and de Boer 2019). Similar successes were replicated across Latin America.

As another example, metropolitan Sao Paolo witnessed a dramatic reduction in its murder rate. The rate dropped from 52.5 per 100,000 in 1999 to just 6.1 per 100,000 in 2018 (Muggah and Szabó de Carvalho 2018).

A combination of SSR-inspired institutional reforms, including the deployment of community police units, new guidelines on the use of force and human rights and technical training among others, were factors in this success (Muggah and de Boer 2019). Moreover,
perceptions of corruption as a key driver of conflict is being increasingly recognized. One example is the role of public frustration in the Arab Spring. Fragile contexts are often marked by a fundamental distrust of security actors as they may have been involved in serious abuses during or in the aftermath of a conflict. The police are a particularly visible sign of a government’s tolerance for corruption, and SSR interventions that establish accountability and oversight of the security sector can play a prominent role in regaining public trust and rooting out corruption. Lastly, unaddressed grievances may be addressed through judicial reform. In the Central African Republic, the DCAF’s evaluation of the Rule of Law program has shown how the establishment of specialized courts enables the investigation of Human Rights abuse, strengthens national capacities for investigations and inquiries, and ultimately, rebuilds trust between judicial institutions and the population.

The link between coping capacities and SSR

Coping capacity of the state and its communities is strengthened by SSR processes that generally include legislative or judicial constraints on executive power (e.g., parliamentary oversight), increased government effectiveness (e.g., in the provision of inclusive security), and enhanced oversight and accountability mechanisms (e.g., capacity building of civil society organizations (CSOs) and the media). Legislative constraints can take the form of parliamentary oversight, including both the development of relevant legislation and a regular and active examination and scrutiny of security sector activities. Therefore, knowledge products that fill the dearth of research and guidance on legislative and parliamentary oversight in languages other than English may assist parliamentary oversight committee members by offering education regarding good practices or providing self-assessment toolkits (DCAF 2018). Fragile contexts are often marked by a lack of social compacts that govern relations between the populace and the state and private sectors. This makes a well-articulated legislative framework which clearly delineates lines of authority and oversight, places legal limits on executive powers, and provides for the protection of human rights a crucial milestone on the pathway out of fragility. Judicial constraints further contribute to increased societal resilience. In North Macedonia, for instance, DCAF supported a series of reforms that established judicial constraint following a political crisis revealing the political misuse of intelligence services (Aidstream 2020).

Coping capacities designed to increase societal resilience are further strengthened by increasing government effectiveness and accountability. A lack of state capacity may prevent the effective provision of security as a universal public good. In Colombia, DCAF supported a series of focus groups with women of different ethnic backgrounds in several rural areas to which the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) would be transitioning (DCAF, n.d.). The work led to an improved understanding of the specific security concerns in different communities, as well as physical, economic and social barriers to accessing formal security institutions. In turn, the National Police have been able to improve their protocols for responding to and preventing gender-based violence in rural areas, as they were originally designed for urban areas. Lastly, accountability may be strengthened by engaging with CSOs and the media, both of which are crucial stakeholders in security sector governance. CSOs may research and produce policy recommendations, comment on national or local security policy and practice, or help governments better understand the needs of marginalized groups. In Gambia, DCAF’s project included work with journalists to familiarize them with the role they can play in security sector oversight (The Gambian Times 2019; Fondation Hirondelle 2019). More broadly, the Gambia project was designed to create security sector reform a matter of public interest at a critical time of political transition. This was done in several ways, including a public perception study and work with the media and civil society to increase oversight of, and input into, the SSR process.

However, there is a need to reflect on the assumptions underpinning internationally-led SSR support. Certain fragile contexts may exhibit hybrid forms of state where formal and informal security sector actors are interconnected and thus challenge conventional modalities of assistance. Understanding local contexts and the ensuing redistribution of power following SSR processes is crucial for effective engagement in fragile contexts. This may exhibit societal structures that go beyond the Weberian state model.

Recommendations

Supporting governance-driven approaches in fragile contexts

The G20 should support modalities of accountable, holistic, and governance-driven security sector engagement to alleviate risk exposure and strengthen coping capacities of the state and its communities in fragile contexts. This would enable the creation of conditions in which all people can live work and thrive.

Taking a holistic approach to public sector reform

The G20 can help to ensure that SSR is considered within the wider context of public sector reform. While the security sector is distinct from
other parts of the public sector, it will ultimately be shaped by broader trends in governance (e.g. decentralization, urbanization, digitalization) and cannot be separated from the broader social contract between the state and its people. It is essential that donors and their partners make informed decisions regarding investments in security as well as investments in other sectors such as education or health, which may have an equally significant impact on fragility.

**Establishing an SSG/R forum of the G20**

The G20 should leverage its comparative advantage as a leading platform of dialogue for G20-states, think tanks, and civil society organizations, including voices from the Global South. This will create a forum that allows the sharing of good practices and lessons learned on security and justice sector governance and links these issues of public trust, legitimacy, and social cohesion. The G20 would thereby collectively signal political willingness to reposition SSG/R as a crucial element of Sustainable Development. Given the G20 as a political and economic body, and its financial weight, the G20 would be well-placed to focus on the political and economic dimensions of security sector governance and reform processes. More specifically, this forum should address:

1. The political nature of SSR interventions and the establishment of accountability at all levels of government.

2. The financial sustainability of security sector reform, and the achievement thereof through, among other measures.

   a. Improved public financial management (PMF), such as transparency of security budgets, inclusion of security expenses into overall national budgeting processes and through regular public expenditure reviews of security sector expenditures, undertaken by the World Bank and the DCAF.

   b. Innovative financial responses to shifting power dynamics, such as financial compensation mechanisms for those who might experience losses due to reforms.

   c. The linkage and alignment of extant measures, such as the current debt relief offered by the G20 to the poorest states due to COVID-19, with SSR processes using national security budgets efficiently and strengthening the accountability of the security sector.

**Conclusion**

The UN-World Bank Pathways to Peace report recognizes fragility and violent conflict as the greatest obstacle to achieving sustainable development. Central to the shared commitment of preventing violent conflict is the need to address grievances around exclusion from power, opportunity, and security. Improving the governance of the security and justice sector by investing in meaningful and financially sustainable reforms supports states in achieving SDG 16, and in turn, paves the way to Sustainable Development. Notably, security sector governance is relevant to all states, including those which may have viewed it only as a foreign assistance tool until now. The universal relevance of security sector reform and its focus on the principles of legitimacy, accountability, and transparency have an optimal position for engagement as a mechanism to strengthen multilateralism and global governance across divergent cultural contexts. This provides the means to operationalize the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, especially target 16.6. The G20’s unique role in global governance, representing 80% of the world’s economic output and two-thirds of the global population, provides the imperative of highlighting the importance of SSG/R in addressing fragility. Good security sector governance is only one part of the solution required to address fragility. It does, however, constitute a fundamental and necessary requirement.

**Disclaimer**

This policy brief was developed and written by the authors and has undergone a peer review process. The views and opinions expressed in this policy brief are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the authors’ organizations or the T20 Secretariat.

**References**

Existing Initiatives & Analysis